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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHERYL MONDERS,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

vs.
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,

:

APPELLANTS BRIEF

:

Case No. 950261-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendants/Respondents.

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, Kenneth Wayne Monders, by and through counsel, James
C. Lewis and George S. Diumenti II, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby
submits the following BRIEF:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this appeal is properly before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the
provisions of Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). The Supreme Court
has assigned this appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4A of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and that transfer dated April 26, 1995.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1)

Whether the Trial Court erred in granting to plaintiff the Outlaw Saloon and related

building and real property, when there was no evidence regarding the value of the business, and
1

it is clear on the record that plaintiff stated in no uncertain terms in discovery responses, that she
intended to sell the Outlaw Saloon and related real estate.
2) Whether the Trial Court erred by failing to order a sale of the Outlaw Saloon and real
property, in view of plaintiffs statement that she intended to sell such real property, and her
failure to subsequently supplement her responses to discovery.
3) Whether the Trial Court erred in finding a value for the Outlaw Saloon of $155,000,
when no evidence was presented by the parties as to the value of the business.
4) Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to recognize substantial contributions to the
Outlaw Saloon by defendant, by awarding defendant less than only one-fourth of the Outlaw
Saloon and related real estate - a marital asset.
5)

Whether the Trial Court erred in granting to plaintiff, free of any claim by

defendant, all of the rights, claims, choses in action, to an option to purchase a parcel of real
property, when the option was held by both parties, and the evidence at trial was uncontroverted
that (a) the option had substantial value; (b) the property under the option had substantial value
exceeding the option price; and (c) plaintiff had no intention of exercising the option.
The standard of review with regard to the issues enumerated above, is a correction of
error standard.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES
OR RULES
(see Addendum for verbatim test)

1. Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE; COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Nature of the Case
This is a divorce proceeding between Plaintiff Cheryl Monders (hereinafter referred to as
"plaintiff"), and Defendant Kenneth Wayne Monders (hereinafter referred to as the "defendant"
or "appellant"). Defendant appeals from the judgment, order and decree in the District Court,
regarding issues of property division.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court
This matter was tried to the lower court on January 3, 1995, whereupon the trial court
granted plaintiff a divorce from defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The sole
issues presented at trial were the division of property and assets of the marriage, and neither party
sought, nor did the trial court consider, alimony. On or about January 5, 1995, the trial court
issued a memorandum decision whereby the parties' principal marital assets, a business known
as the Outlaw Saloon, and related real estate, were awarded to plaintiff, subject to an obligation
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in favor of defendant. On or about January 25, 1995, proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and a decree of divorce, were submitted to the court by plaintiff. On or about February 7,
1995, defendant submitted specific objections to plaintiffs proposed findings of fact, and
conclusions of law. On or about February 17, 1995, the trial court entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, in the form submitted by plaintiff. Notice of appeal
was filed March 20, 1995.
H. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This action involves proceedings for a divorce and other relief pertinent to such action
sought in the lower court by the parties. The parties were married on April 25, 1987, in Las
Vegas, Nevada, and were husband and wife until the entry of the decree of divorce. The divorce
complaint in this matter was filed in January, 1994. There were no children from the marriage.
At the time of the marriage, plaintiff was employed at a motel and restaurant in Moab,
Utah. A few months prior to the marriage in November, 1986, plaintiff, with the assistance of
defendant, opened a bar known as the "Outlaw Saloon", which was located in a leased space in
Moab, Utah. (T.R. 92 and 143-144). The Outlaw Saloon had been opened through the joint
efforts of the parties, but prior to the marriage of the parties (Transcript Record at 211, lines 9 16; 232, line 13, to 233, line 13.)
From the date of establishment of the Outlaw Saloon, defendant worked in the business
and represented himself to be a co-owner of the saloon. (T.R. 50-51,145-146). From the time
of establishment of the saloon, defendant believed the parties had a verbal understanding that they
would be partners in the business. (T.R. 234 - 235; 254, lines 9-24). Plaintiff had invested
approximately twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) of her money into the establishment of the
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saloon operation. Despite contributing most of his time in 1987 and 1988 to the Outlaw Saloon
business, defendant was not paid for his efforts on behalf of the business. (T.R. 57, line 22; 158,
lines 2-11; 236, lines 16-23; 250, line 2-19). Defendant contributed his time to the business
from 1988 to 1990, for which defendant received very little compensation. (T.R. 249-252, line
2). Plaintiff, who was working full time at another job, did not work in the saloon for the first
three years (T.R. 211, lines 17-24), and acted as the person responsible for bookkeeping, payroll
and financial matters relating to the business (T.R. at 48, lines 3-4, 154-155).
Defendant worked in the Outlaw Saloon from the day it opened until it changed location
in 1991, except for a brief period of approximately 3 months in which he attempted to start
another business (during which time he worked for the business part time). (T.R. 236, line 24,
to 237, line 10). He continued to work in the bar until the parties separated in November, 1993
(T.R. 250, line 2, to 252, line 2).
In the latter part of 1990, the parties became aware that the Outlaw Saloon had to be
relocated, and they began looking for a new location for the saloon. (T.R. 157, lines 4-10; 239,
line 10, to 240, line 9). In October, 1990, the parties found a parcel of real property, including
a building, owned by plaintiffs uncle, and entered into a purchase contract for the purchase of
this real property, for the sum of $80,000, of which $23,000 was paid at the time of entering into
the contract, and the balance of $57,000 was financed at the rate of 10% per annum, payable over
ten years. The down payment was paid by plaintiff. (T.R. 103-107; 239-240; and Exhibit P 13). On the same day as the purchase contract, the seller also granted to plaintiff and defendant
a written option to purchase the lot adjacent to the real property under the purchase contract, for
the sum of $10,000, exercisable within one year. (T.R. 107, and Exhibit P-15).
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At the time

of the purchase agreement, plaintiff was aware that the building on the lot which was being
purchased encroached onto the lot under option. (T.R. 106, lines 17-24; 158, line 20 to 159, line
7).
After entering into the purchase agreement, the parties worked together to remodel and
make improvements to the existing building to establish and operate the Outlaw Saloon at this
new location. The parties opened the Outlaw Saloon at the new location together (T.R. 150, lines
13-15). The Outlaw Saloon ceased operations at its original location in approximately August,
1991, and reopened at its new location in the latter part of 1991. (T.R. 100).
In 1988, after the original Outlaw Saloon was opened, plaintiff created a corporation to
own and operate the Outlaw Saloon. Although defendant was an officer and director of the
corporation until after the parties separated, plaintiff effectively removed plaintiff from all
management actions, and issued all of the outstanding stock of the corporation to herself.
Plaintiff operated the corporation without holding valid board of directors meetings, and in
disregard of required corporate formalities. (T.R. 188-190, 192-193; 238, line 14, to 239, line
9; and Exhibits P-21 and P-22).
In October, 1991, when the option to purchase the adjoining lot was due to expire,
plaintiff attempted to exercise the option. Seller, plaintiffs uncle, refused to accept the tender
by plaintiff.

In October, 1993, plaintiffs counsel sent to plaintiffs uncle a letter, asserting

plaintiffs compliance in exercising the option, and plaintiffs intention to take legal action if
necessary. (T.R. 159, lines 24, to 160, line 8 and Exhibit D-21). Despite her knowledge that
a portion of the Outlaw Saloon, and part of the parking lot of the Outlaw Saloon, sits on the
adjacent lot which was under option, plaintiff indicated at tnal and in responses to discovery that
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she did not intend to further pursue enforcement of the option agreed upon or the purchase of
the adjacent lot. (T.R. 167, lines 10-11, 212, lines 3-7, and Exhibit D-24, response to Request
for Admission Number 1; and Exhibit D-25, response to interrogatory Nos. 19 and 23).
Plaintiff is presently under a month to month rental arrangement for the use of the adjacent
property, but has no written agreement with her uncle (T.R. I l l , lines 4-9), except the option
described above.
On March 2, 1992, the parties signed an agreement which contemplated the joint
ownership and operation of the Outlaw Saloon, and the reimbursement by defendant to plaintiff
of $30,000, or one-half of the amount ($60,000) it was estimated plaintiff had invested in the
business. (T.R. 129-131,151-152). This agreement also divided responsibility for the operation
of the bar, set salaries for plaintiff and defendant, and outlined a means for preserving the marital
union. Neither party complied with the terms of the agreement. The trial court found that this
agreement was not useful as a legal document because it was breached by both parties, and
because agreements between parties to a marriage are usually not binding. However, the trial
court found that the agreement was helpful as an expression of the states of mind of the parties
prior to divorce proceedings, and as an expression by both parties that the Outlaw Saloon was
a joint marital venture, and that plaintiff had a substantial investment in the venture. Despite its
finding that the evidence demonstrated, contrary to plaintiffs assertions, that the Outlaw Saloon
and related real property was a marital asset, the trial court determined that plaintiff was entitled
to three fourths of the assets, after deductions of amounts invested by plaintiff. (See
Memorandum Decision dated January 5, 1995, pp 4-5, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, par. 21-22).
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At the trial, plaintiff presented evidence from Joe David Kingsley, a real estate agent in
the Moab area, regarding the value of the real estate which is the location of the Outlaw Saloon.
(T.R. 20). On cross-examination, Mr. Kingsley expressly stated that his opinions did not take
into account a going concern valuation of the business; that he did not know what the Outlaw
Saloon business would "fetch in the market", and that he had inadequate information to form an
opinion regarding the value of the business. (T.R. 22 and 29).

In its findings, the trial court

states that plaintiffs "evidence about the value of the Outlaw Saloon was not countered by
evidence from [defendant]", and that "[plaintiffs] expert opined that the total value of the
business and the real estate on which it is located is $155,000". (See Memorandum Decisions
dated January 25, 1995, p. 5, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, par. 23). However,
no evidence was presented by either party regarding the value of the business. In fact, on crossexamination, plaintiff could not answer numerous basic questions regarding the financial
statements for the Outlaw Saloon, prepared by plaintiffs accountant at plaintiffs direction. (T.R.
195-199).

As indicated below, defendant did not present evidence regarding the value of the

business, due to plaintiffs responses to discovery in which she indicated that she intended to sell
the business. (T.R. 203, line 9, to 205, line 7; and discussion on the record, 205, line 11, to 210,
line 25; and Exhibits D-24 and D-25).
On cross-examination, Joe Kingsley stated that the property subject to the option
agreement had a value of "around $25,000", or substantially in excess of the $10,000 exercise
price of the lot, and that such lot would be worth even more if owned or purchased by the owner
of the adjoining lot (where the Outlaw Saloon was located). (T.R. 35 and 39-40).
On cross-examination, plaintiff acknowledged that in responses to interrogatories and
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requests for admission propounded by defendant, dated November 29,1994, or slightly more than
one month before the trial in this matter (and one day before a previously scheduled trial), she
had stated that she intended to sell the business.

Plaintiff further acknowledged that she

subsequently changed her mind regarding her intent to sell the business. (T.R. 204-205).
In Defendant's Exhibit 24, in response to a request for admission (Number 1), plaintiff
admits that she is "willing to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon for the sum of ONE
HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($150,000), payable in cash payable within
sixty (60) days of the earnest money agreement provided that the person purchasing the property
is willing to assume all title defects associated with the property, and further assuming that the
plaintiff will not be required to pay any real estate commissions, costs of sale beyond title
insurance and recording fees and will have to pay no costs for purposes of clearing title to any
portion of this sale property." Similarly, in response to a second set of discovery propounded
by defendant, Exhibit D-25, interrogatory number 19, also dated November 29, 1994, plaintiff
stated that she has "told a thousand people that this business [the Outlaw Saloon] will be for sale
upon the completion of this divorce. The names, addresses and telephone numbers is too lengthy
to list at this time."

Finally, in response to interrogatory Number 23 of such discovery

propounded by defendant (Exhibit D-25), plaintiff states that she is "willing to sell the business
known as the Outlaw Saloon, Inc., of which I am the 100% stockholder and president together
with the real property on which it is located . . . " As indicated, these discovery responses were
received on or about November 29,1994, or approximately one month prior to the trial date, and
three days prior to an earlier scheduled trial date on December 2, 1994, which was continued at
the time the parties appeared the day of the trial. The record is clear - no effort was undertaken
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by plaintiff to supplement this discovery to notify defendant of her change of mind regarding the
sale of the business. (See discussions at trial, pages 205-210).
As a result of plaintiffs discovery responses, and her subsequent failure to supplement
such discovery, defendant did not put on any evidence at trial regarding the value of the business
(nor did plaintiff); because it appeared clear that it was the desire of both parties to sell the
business. (T.R. 205-210).
In its findings, the trial court found that the real property and business was a marital asset,
and that although the "usual presumption is that marital property should be divided equally after
pre-marital contributions are returned", plaintiff should be awarded three fourths of the value of
the marital assets. This determination was based on the trial court's conclusion that (a) plaintiff
was in greater need of the marital assets, and (b) "most of the appreciation of the business and
property is due to an overall increase in Moab property values and not to any efforts of either
party to make the business a success". Based on these findings, the trial court awarded plaintiff
the real property and business, subject only to an obligation in favor of defendant in the amount
of $13,000, equal to one-fourth of the net value of these assets of $112,000, as determined by
the trial court, after deducting the sum of $60,000, or the amount the trial court determined
plaintiff had contributed to the business from pre-marital assets. The trial court determined that
this obligation to defendant in the amount of $13,000 (together with an additional obligation from
a marital asset in the amount of $5,500 which is not pertinent to this appeal), would be payable
to defendant over a period of 8 years, with interest at the rate of seven (7%) per annum, in
monthly payments of $250, commencing on February 1, 1995. (See Memorandum Decision
dated January 5,1995, pages 6-7, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 2 5 -
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29). The trial court additionally found that the parties claim to the adjacent lot under the option
agreement, "has little or no value", and awarded the claim to the lot to plaintiff.

(See

Memorandum Decision, page 6, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 24).
On approximately February 7, 1995, defendant submitted specific objections to the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, submitted to the trial court by plaintiff. On
approximately February 17,1995, without further proceedings, hearing on defendant's objections
or notice to the parties, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree
of divorce in the form, or substantially the form, submitted by plaintiff.
At the time of the marriage, plaintiff had a substantial amount of pre-marital assets,
including approximately $20,000 invested in the Outlaw Saloon, $9,90 in currency, $15,524 in
a savings account, $9,000 in an individual retirement account, motel stock worth $11,445,
$10,000 in a tax-exempt bond, and miscellaneous assets. (T.R. 68-91; 97-99; and Exhibits P-4
through P-9). Defendant brought no significant assets to the marriage. (T.R. 264-265).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In awarding the real property, business and related option rights to plaintiff, subject only
to a small obligation in favor of defendant, the trial court erred and abused its discretion in a
number of respects. First, the trial court's award of these marital assets to plaintiff was blatantly
inconsistent with plaintiffs answers to defendant's discovery, received by defendant shortly before
trial, in which she indicated her clear intent to sell the business and real estate, which answers
she did not supplement timely before trial as required, thereby prejudicing defendant. Second,
these marital assets were awarded to plaintiff, subject to a small obligation to defendant, despite
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no evidence at trial regarding the value of the business. Third, in awarding to defendant onefourth of what the trial court determined to be the net equity of the marital assets, payable over
8 years, the trial court did not properly consider the substantial contributions made by defendant
to the business. Finally, the trial court erred in awarding to plaintiff the option rights to an
adjacent parcel of property, a potentially valuable marital asset which defendant wanted and
which plaintiff stated she had no intention to exercise.

ARGUMENT

I-II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY
AS A SANCTION FOR FAILURE TO COOPERATE FULLY IN DISCOVERY
Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with
a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to
include information thereafter acquired, except as follows: (2)(B) he knows that the
response though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that
a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment.
It is uncontroverted that plaintiff, in answers to defendant's discovery which were received
by defendant just over one month prior to the trial in this matter (and 2-3 days prior to an earlier
scheduled trial), plaintiff stated in no uncertain terms that it was her intention to sell the Outlaw
Saloon and the real estate on which it is located. (T.R. 204-205; Exhibit D-24, response to
request for admission number 1; Exhibit D-25, response to interrogatory numbers 23 and 24).
Knowing full well that defendant would rely on this information in preparing for trial, plaintiff
intentionally failed to appropriately supplement her discovery, but, instead, chose to surprise
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defendant at trial by indicating that she had changed her mind and now wanted to own and
operate the business. (T.R. 204-205, 136-138).
Pursuant to URCP 37 any number of sanctions were available to the Judge to deal with
this bad faith failure to amend.
Clearly defendant was seriously prejudiced by the deception of plaintiff when she failed
to seasonably supplement her discovery. It was uncontroverted that she had indicated her desire
to sell the business, as noted above, and therefore defendant had every right to rely on this
representation by not providing evidence on the value of the property and business. Obviously,
the best measure of value of a business and real estate is what a seller can obtain in a sale in the
market. Since defendant believed, justifiably, that both parties wanted to sell the business, it was
only logical to assume that the best way to optimize the value of the assets, is to put them on
the market - the relief sought by defendant, which was what plaintiff clearly indicated was her
intent prior to the day of trial. By "springing" this evidence on defendant at trial, plaintiff denied
defendant the opportunity to present evidence regarding the value of the business and the real
estate - the single largest issue in this cause.
The judge compounded this bad faith by making findings based on incomplete evidence
of value, which requires reversal and a new hearing to determine the full correct value of the
asset. It is fundamentally inequitable to allow plaintiff to deceive defendant with improper
discovery responses, with no appropriate supplementation, and then further allow the judge to
effectively ratify this behavior by making findings based on it, all of which was made clear in
defendant's objections to the order (See T.R. 205-210, and Defendant's Objections to Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law).

Furthermore, it would appear that case law would
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make it incumbent on the trial court to either (a) sanction plaintiff for her improper actions,
rather than rewarding her by ratifying them, or (b) require the presentation of additional evidence
regarding the value of the business.
In the case of Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held
that if the trial court found contempt on the part of a party, it was required to sanction said party,
or provide a finding explaining the failure to do so. Although defendant herein argued for
sanctions, or an order of sale of the property, no sanctions were made, the court did not
implement a remedial approach which would have the effect of correcting the prejudice to
defendant, nor did it offer and explanation for its decision to reward defendant for her flagrant
failure to comply with discovery rules.
If defendant had any clue that the judge would use such tainted evidence in his findings,
certainly a continuance would have been sought in order to address the problem. Since defendant
could not have anticipated that the judge would use such highly prejudicial and improper
evidence, he had no reason to seek a continuance, especially given the continued request to the
court that the property be ordered sold according to plaintiffs oft-repeated desires. On this
ground alone the case must be remanded for further evidence of valuation, or an order of sale,
see e.g., Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). In said case the Supreme Court remarked at
length about the ambiguities and lack of clarity in the finding of the court regarding the value
of various properties, and stated: "In view of this evidence a more thorough hearing which fully
explores the value of the business and the income generating capabilities of the Reads is
warranted.", and remanded. Id at 873.
A recent case from this court addresses this issue, Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144
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(Utah App. 1988). In Naranjo, it was noted that a trial court's decree is entitled to a presumption
of validity but: "Changes will be made only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against
the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
Id. at 1146. Defendant submits to the court that there was an open and obvious misapplication
of the law herein, that not only did the evidence preponderate against the findings, but the
findings were based upon no evidence whatsoever, and that an extremely serious inequity has
resulted, given that the effect of the award is that defendant worked for several years as a partner
in a venture for which he now gets very little. This court should review the facts and make its
own judgment, pursuant to the holding of Wilson v. Wilson, 296 P.2d 977 (Utah 1956), wherein
the court held "[A] divorce proceeding is equitable and that it is within the prerogative of this
court to review the evidence and to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court under proper
circumstances." IdL at 981.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A VALUE FOR THE OUTLAW SALOON
The trial court awarded to plaintiff the Outlaw Saloon and real estate, despite the fact that
there was no evidence presented at trial regarding the value of the business. In its Memorandum
Decision dated January 5, 1995, the Court states on page 5 that "[plaintiffs] evidence about the
value of the Outlaw Saloon was not countered by evidence from [defendant]" and "[plaintiffs]
expert opined that the total value of the business and the real estate on which it is operated is
$155,000". In reality, plaintiffs expert made it clear that he did not have an opinion regarding
the value of the business. (T.R. 22 and 29), nor was any other evidence as to the business's value
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presented by either party. As indicated above, the defendant had no reason to present evidence
regarding the value of the business, because he prepared for trial with the clear impression, based
on plaintiffs discovery responses, that both parties wanted to sell the business and real estate.
The bulk of the argument from section M I also addresses this issue. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that a trial court needs a clear record upon which to base its
findings.
In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), a case was remanded back to
the trial court because the Supreme Court held: "On the present record, we cannot determine
whether the trial court distributed the property equitably. To avoid problems of this nature, we
require that when one of the parties to a property distribution raises a serious question as to the
value of one...of the assets, the trial court's distribution of those assets should be based upon
written findings of fact that will permit appellate review." Id. at 1074 (citations omitted).
Obviously, in the instant case the foundation of the trial court's findings of value are laid
upon no evidence whatsoever, and therefore, even though there are written findings, they are not
of a nature or quality that permits review, nor are they calculated to allow the appellate court to
determine their equity or lack thereof. Therefore, this case should be remanded for further
findings regarding valuation of the business.

IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRIBUTIONS OF DEFENDANT

It was uncontroverted at trial that from 1987 through the date of separation of the parties
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in the end of 1993, defendant devoted a substantial portion of his time to the business.
Defendant was not paid for his services on behalf of the business in 1987 and 1988, and paid a
paltry sum thereafter. (T.R. 57, 158, 236, 250). Despite his substantial contribution of time to
the business, defendant was awarded what the court determined to be one-fourth of the net asset
value of the business and marital property, payable over 8 years!

This is clearly inequitable

given the relative contributions of the parties.
As indicated, it was uncontroverted at trial that defendant had spent a very substantial
portion of the marriage working full-time or nearly so for the benefit of the Outlaw Saloon; he
devoted over six years to this enterprise. It was further uncontroverted that he received next to
nothing as remuneration for this work. This is a classic example of "sweat equity," and its value
is recognized by Utah courts, see e.g., the Preston case discussed above.
The trial court's determination that plaintiff should receive the great majority of the
marital assets, and the benefit of the business and real estate (despite an absence of valuation of
the business and plaintiffs stated intention to sell the business), was based on its conclusions that:
(a) plaintiff was older and in greater need of the assets; and (b) most of the appreciation of the
in the "value of the business" was due to an overall increase in Moab property values". (See
Memorandum Decision, page 6). These conclusions were clearly not supported by the evidence.
First, while its was established that defendant had no assets, it was equally clear that plaintiff had
substantial other assets to support herself. Secondly, as indicated throughout this brief, there was
no evidence to support the valuation regarding the business, upon which the trial court could
conclude that the appreciation of such value is attributable to appreciation in Moab property
values. Thirdly, the trial court had no reason to conclude (if it did conclude; the findings are not
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clear) that defendant contributed any less, through his efforts, than plaintiff in maintaining the
business, in order that it could appreciate.
In considering and fashioning equitable property division in a divorce, trial courts need
to consider all pertinent circumstances. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). The factors
a trial court should consider in dividing property in a divorce are such things as the amount and
kind of property to be divided, whether property was acquired before or during marriage, the
sorts of property, health of the parties, respective standards of living and financial conditions,
needs, earning capacity, duration of marriage, children of marriage, parties ages at time of
marriage and divorce, what the parties gave up by the marriage, whether one or both spouses has
made a contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. IcL at 135.
In the instant case, while the trial court appeared to consider these factors as they applied
to plaintiff, it also appeared to disregard these factors in respect to the defendant. Defendant
made substantial contributions to the business, which enabled the parties to maintain ownership
of the property and realize the "appreciation in value" to which the trial court appears to give
plaintiff full credit. Defendant devoted six years to the enterprise, and is now in a far worse
financial position than plaintiff. This result is inequitable.
In reversing an inequitable marital asset division, this court recently held: "The overriding
consideration in property division is that the ultimate division be equitable-that property be fairly
divided between the parties given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances
at the time of the divorce. On remand, the trial court should follow the systematic approach set
forth in Burt. That is, the court should first properly categorize the parties' property as part of
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the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other as set forth in this opinion. Each
is then presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the
marital property, absent special circumstances property accumulated by the parties during the
marriage should be equally divided. We find that the trial court abused its discretion when it
justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital property based solely on the parties'
economic contributions to the marriage...", Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990) at
1322-3, (citations omitted).
The trial court herein seriously violated the spirit and intent of the Dunn decision. Equity
absolutely demands that this case be remanded for further findings based on real evidence.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ALL OF THE OPTIONED LAND
RIGHTS TO PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff and defendant had a very valuable option right to property adjacent to the saloon.
Although under the contract the option price was $10,000, evidence at trial was that the land was
worth at least $25,000, and considerably more to the parties since it was contiguous to their
business. (T.R. 35, 39-40). Further, plaintiff testified that she had no intention to pursue the
option. (T.R. 167). Nevertheless, and despite a request that the option rights be granted to
defendant, the trial court awarded plaintiff the entire option to plaintiff, depriving defendant of
a valuable property right.
Plaintiff will argue that the award of the option to plaintiff is appropriate because, as the
trial court indicated, it has little value. However, the evidence introduced at trial is contrary to
that conclusion. In a letter from plaintiffs counsel to the owner of the property under option (D21) long after the expiration date, plaintiff claims that she tendered payment under the option
19

timely, and asserts all of her rights (interestingly, not defendant's, who was a party to the option),
under the option.
This distribution is, on its face, inequitable, and becomes even more so when the valuation
of the underlying business is taken into account. As will be noted below in the analysis of the
Naranjo case, supra, such inequity demands that the judgment be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully seeks an order of the Court reversing the trial court's division of
the marital assets, awarding the Outlaw Saloon and related real property and property rights to
the parties equally and ordering a sale of such property, or, alternatively, that this matter be
remanded to the trial court for further findings regarding the value of the business and an equal
division of the marital assets based on such valuation.
Respectfully submitted this u^ day of September, 1995.

les Cr Lewis
'DIUMENTI &4LEWIS
^05 SQXIXHi^lAIN STREET
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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marriage, those benefits continued and were extended to J.W.

A

few months before the marriage, J.W. began working in the bar,
terminating his minimum wage employment as a custodian for
another motel.

From that point forward, J.W. worked regularly in

the bar, except for three months when he attempted to start a
business for himself, until the parties separated in November,
1993.

Cheryl managed and worked in the bar during the same

period of time.
In late 199 0, Cheryl became aware that the motel and
restaurant where she worked would be torn down.

Construction of

a new motel would require use of the space where she operated her
bar.

She therefore began looking for another location.

On

October 2, 199 0, she contracted to purchase a new lot with a
building from her uncle for $23,000 down and a balance of $57,000
at ten percent per annum over ten years.

J.W. was a party to the

contract, but furnished none of the down payment.

The down

payment came from pre-marital and inherited property of Cheryl.
On this same day, the uncle granted Cheryl and J.W. an
option to purchase the adjacent lot for $10,000.

The option was

to be exercised within one year.
Cheryl then began to remodel and improve the existing
building to create a place to operate her bar.

All of the

remodeling funds came from Cheryl's premarital or inherited
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On October 2, 1991, when the option for the adjacent
lot was due to expire, Cheryl decided to exercise the option and
contacted her uncle for that purpose.

Her uncle rejected her

tender and told her that she and J.W. would do better to put
their money into a home.

The record reflects no further effort

to acquire the adjacent lot until October 25, 1993, when Cheryl's
lawyer wrote a letter to Cheryl's uncle in an attempt to persuade
him to go through with the sale.
decided to abandon the effort.

That effort failed and Cheryl

A portion of the saloon building

actually sits on the adjacent lot and the parking lot is located
in part on that parcel.

Cheryl presently pays her uncle $100 per

month for the right to occupy that property, but has no written
agreement with him.
After their separation in November, 1993, the parties
entered into a struggle for control of the bar and the living
quarters there.

At the time of trial, Cheryl had prevailed and

was living in and managing the bar without any help from J.W.
On March 2, 1992, Cheryl at J.W. signed an agreement.
That agreement estimated Cheryl's investment in the business at
$60,000 and provided that J.W. would reimburse her for half of
that, or $30,000.

The agreement also divided responsibility for

operation of the bar, set salaries for Cheryl and J.W., and
outlined a means for preserving the marital union.

J.W. did not

make more than the first few payments under this agreement, and
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Antenuptial and postnuptial agreements can be enforceable in Utah, but only under
conditions that this agreement made no effort, to meet.
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chance of legal compelling the uncle to consummate the sale of
the adjacent lot, prospects of success have been dimmed by their
failure to pursue their claim.

Because Cheryl has the best

chance of being able to deal with her uncle for that adjacent
lot, the Court believes it is most appropriate that the business,
the real estate, and the claim to the adjacent lot, if any, be
awarded to Cheryl.
The Court finds that the net value of all of these
assets is $112,000.

Cheryl had invested $60,000 of her separate

pre-marital or inherited property in the business as of March,
1992.

She is entitled to recover all of that investment.

The

remaining value must be equitably divided between Cheryl and J.W.
The usual presumption is that marital property should
be divided equally after premarital contributions are returned.
However, there are two facts that suggest the need for a
different division in this case:
1.

Cheryl is 51 years old.

J.W. is 38 years old.

Cheryl has also suffered an injury to her leg that seriously
limits her ability to work.

She has a greater need for marital

assets.
2.

Most, if not all, of the appreciation in the value

of the business is due to an overall increase in Moab property
values, not to any efforts of either party to make the business a
success.

In fact, bars like the Outlaw Saloon are not a "growth
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directed to prepare appropriate findings, conclusions and a
decree
DATED this 5th day of January, 1995.

Lyle R, Anderson, District Judge
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fully

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff was an actual and bona fide resident

of Grand County, State of Utah, and had been for more than three
(3) months immediately next prior to the commencement of this
action.
2.

The parties hereto were married on the 25th day of

April, 1987 at Las Vegas, Clark County, State of Nevada and have
been husband and wife since that date.
3.

The parties hereto separated on or about November,

1993 and have lived separate and apart since that time.
4.

The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have

developed between the parties which makes it impossible for them to
maintain

a marital

relationship

and, therefore, the

Plaintiff

should be granted a Decree of Divorce terminating her marriage to
the Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
5.

There have been no children born as the issue of

this marriage and none are expected.
6.
(hereinafter

At

the

called

time

of

"Cheryl")

their
was

marriage,

employed

at

the
a

Plaintiff
motel

and

restaurant in Moab, Utah and she also owned and operated a bar in
Moab known as the Outlaw Saloon. The assets of the bar had been
purchased with Cheryl's money. She operated the bar in a rented
building.
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until the parties separated in November of 1993. Cheryl managed and
also worked in the bar during the same period of time.
11.
restaurant

In late 1990, Cheryl became aware that the motel and

where

she

worked

were

scheduled

to be

torn

down.

Construction of a new motel would require the use of the space
where she had been operating the bar. She, therefore, began looking
for another location.
12.

On October 2, 1990, Cheryl contracted to purchase a

lot building from her uncle for TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND ($23,000.00)
DOLLARS down and the balance of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00)
DOLLARS to be financed at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum
over ten (10) years. J.W. was a party to the contract but furnished
none of the down payment. The down payment came from the premarital and inherited property of Cheryl. (Cheryl inherited SIXTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED ($16,600.00) DOLLARS in cash from her father's
estate in 1988 and THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTEEN ($3,316.00)
DOLLARS in cash plus a right to ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE ($183.00)
DOLLARS per month for seven (7) years from her mother's estate in
1991.) On the same day, the uncle granted Cheryl and J.W. an option
to purchase the adjacent lot for TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLARS.
Said option was to be exercised within one (1) year.
13.

Cheryl

then

began

to

remodel

and

improve

the

existing building to create a place to operate her bar. All of the
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remodeling

funds

came

from

Cheryl's

pre-marital

or

inherited

property.
14.

Cheryl had incorporated the Outlaw Saloon in 1988.

She was its sole shareholder and, in exchange for the shares, she
had conveyed all of the property and assets of the original Outlaw
Saloon into said corporation. Throughout the marriage, she has
remained the sole owner of all of the shares of said corporation.
15.

Cheryl

loaned

the

remodeling

funds

to

the

corporation from her sole and separate property. Cheryl claims to
have loaned a total of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00) DOLLARS to
the corporation for the remodeling. However, the 1991 corporate tax
returns list stockholder loans to the corporation of only TWENTYFIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($25,500.00) DOLLARS as of the end of
1991.

Cheryl

has

presented

no

other

documentation

of

that

investment. Cheryl has shown that she sold her motel stock in 1991,
presumably to finance the remodeling effort. At the time of its
sale, the motel

stock was worth

FIFTEEN THOUSAND

($15,000.00)

DOLLARS.
16.
through

J.W. and Cheryl filed joint tax returns for 1987

1992 and Cheryl filed corporate tax returns from

1989

through 1992. Every tax return showed Cheryl as the sole proprietor
of the bar before its incorporation and the sole owner of the
corporation after its creation. Cheryl is the only shareholder in
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the corporation although J.W. served as a director and a nominal
secretary.
17.

The Outlaw Saloon ceased operation at its original

location in August of 1991 and the new bar opened in October of
1991.
18.

The new bar included living quarters for Cheryl and

J.W. During the course of the marriage, J.W.'s meals, lodging,
insurance and transportation needs were provided as a condition of
Cheryl's employment or in conjunction with the operation of the
business. J.W. received no separate compensation until 1989 for his
work in the business.
19.

On October 2, 1991, when the option to purchase the

adjacent lot was due to expire, Cheryl decided to exercise the
option and contacted her uncle for that purpose. Her uncle rejected
her tender and told her that she and J.W. would do better to put
their money into a home. The record reflects no further effort to
acquire the adjacent lot until October 25, 1993 when

Cheryl's

lawyer wrote a letter to Cheryl's uncle in an attempt to persuade
him "to go through with the sale. That effort failed and Cheryl
decided to abandon the effort. A portion of the Saloon building
actually sits on the adjacent lot and a significant portion of the
parking lot is located on part of said parcel. Cheryl presently
pays her uncle ONE HUNDRED

($100.00) DOLLARS per month for the
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right to occupy said property but has no written agreement with
him.
20.

After

their

separation

in

November,

1993,

the

parties entered into a struggle for control of the bar and the
living quarters therein. At the time of trial, Cheryl had prevailed
and was living in and managing the bar without any help from J.W.
21.

On

March

2,

1992,

Cheryl

and

J.W.

signed

an

agreement. That agreement estimated Cheryl's investment in the
business at SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS and provided that
J.W. would reimburse her for one-half of that amount or the sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND

($30,000.00) DOLLARS. The agreement also divided

responsibility for the operation of the bar, set salaries for
Cheryl and J.W., and outlined a means for preserving the marital
union. J.W. did not make more than the first few payments under
this agreement and did not sell his trailer and pay over the
proceeds as he had agreed. He explained this breach as a natural
consequence of the failure of the corporation to pay all of the
salary provided by the agreement.
22.

The 1992 agreement is not useful as a legal document

because it was breached by both parties. Agreements between the
parties to a marriage are not usually binding on a divorce court.
(Antenuptial and postnuptial agreements can be enforceable in Utah
but only under conditions that this agreement made no effort to
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meet.) The agreement is most helpful as an expression of the states
of mind of Cheryl and J.W. at a time when the pre-divorce legal
posturing had not yet begun. The agreement reflects a recognition
by both parties that the bar has been a joint marital venture but
that Cheryl alone had made a substantial financial investment in
that

venture.

Based

on

this

agreement

and

the

circumstances

outlined above, the Court finds that the bar is a marital asset but
that equitable division will require that Cheryl receive more than
one-half of this marital asset.
23.

Cheryl's evidence about the value of the Outlaw

Saloon was not countered by evidence from J.W. Cheryl's expert
opined that the total value of the property is ONE HUNDRED FIFTYFIVE THOUSAND ($155,000.00) DOLLARS. The Court accepts this value.
Cheryl

and

J.W.

still

owe

her

uncle

FORTY-THREE

THOUSAND

($43,000.00) DOLLARS for the property.
24.

Although either Cheryl or J.W. may initially have

had a chance of legally compelling the uncle to consummate the sale
of the adjacent lot, prospects of success have been dimmed by their
failure to pursue their claim. The Court finds that their claim to
the adjacent lot has little or no value. Because Cheryl has the
best chance of being able to deal with her uncle for the adjacent
lot, the Court finds that it is most appropriate that the business,
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the real estate, the claim to the adjacent lot, if any, be awarded
to Cheryl.
25.

The Court finds that the net value of all of these

assets is the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND

($112,000.00)

DOLLARS. Cheryl had invested SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS of
her separate pre-marital or inherited property in the business as
of March 1993. The Court finds that she is entitled to recover all
of that investment. The Court must then determine an equitable
distribution for the remaining value of the property.
26.

The usual

presumption

should be divided equally

is

that marital

after pre-marital

property

contributions

are

returned; however, there are two (2) facts that suggest the need
for a different division in this case:
A.

Cheryl is fifty-one

(51) years old. J.W. is

thirty-eight (38) years old. Cheryl has also suffered an injury to
her leg that seriously limits her ability to work. She has a
greater need for marital assets than does J.W.
B.

Most, if not all, of the appreciation in the

value of the business and property is due to an overall increase in
Moab property values and not to any efforts of either party to make
the business a success. In fact, bars like the Outlaw Saloon are
not a "growth industry" in Moab today. The bar is worth more mainly

because the land on which it sits has become more valuable due to
economic changes in the area.
27.

The

Court

finds

that

one-fourth

increased equity or the sum of THIRTEEN

THOUSAND

(1/4)

of

the

($13,000.00)

DOLLARS should be awarded to J.W. as his equitable portion of the
property. The remainder of the increased equity is awarded

to

Cheryl.
28.

J.W. concedes that there is no other marital asset,

except the portion of Cheryl's IRA accumulated during the marriage.
Cheryl contributed EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED ($8,900.00) DOLLARS
to

her

IRA

during

the

marriage

and

those

contributions

had

accumulated interest at an average rate of six point five (6.5%)
percent per annum for an average of four (4) years. The Court finds
that the value of the marital portion of the IRA is ELEVEN THOUSAND
($11,000.00) DOLLARS. One-half of this amount should be awarded to
J.W.
29.

J.W.'s

total

property

award

(THIRTEEN

THOUSAND

($13,000.00) DOLLARS of the increased equity in the property and
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($5,500.00) DOLLARS from the increased
value of the IRA) is the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
($18,500.00) DOLLARS. Said property award shall bear interest at
the rate of seven (7%) percent per annum from January 1, 1995. The
Court finds that Cheryl does not have the capacity to readily

10

borrow said sum of money and, therefore, she will need to make
payments on the property award. The Court finds that the sum of
approximately TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ($250.00) DOLLARS per month would
allow

a

payoff

of

the

property

settlement

over

a

period

of

approximately eight (8) years. Said monthly payments shall commence
on February 1, 1995. As long as the payments are current, no
execution shall issue but J.W. shall be entitled to a lien on the
real estate under the bar in the amount of the property award until
same has been fully paid, together with interest thereon.
30.

Neither

party

has

requested

alimony

during

the

proceeding and the Court awards no alimony herein.
31.

Each party is ordered to bear his or her own Court

costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
32.

The Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of her

Complaint by adequate evidence.
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact
now concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

Plaintiff

is

granted

a

divorce

from

the

2.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and

Defendant.

personal property during this marriage and said property is awarded
as follows:

11

A.

The Plaintiff is awarded the Outlaw Saloon bar

together with all of its assets, and the building and property
where

same

is

located,

free

and

clear of all

claims

of

the

Defendant with the exception that the Defendant shall be entitled
to a lien against the real property until the property settlement
awarded to the Defendant has been fully paid. Said property is
located

in

Moab,

Grand

County,

State

of

Utah

and

is

more

particularly described as follows:
BEG 6 R D N & 150 FT W OF NE CORNER BLK 25 MSS, W 67.5 FT,
N 243 FT, E 67 *a FT, S 243 FT TO BEG. ALT # 26-21-1-93.
ACRES; 0.38
The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the
outstanding

indebtedness

to her uncle, Clair Tangren, for

the

underlying obligation on said property and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded any claim or chose-in-

action which the parties may have, free and clear of all claims of
the Defendant, against the Plaintiff's uncle Clair Tangren with
respect to the adjacent lot located in Moab, Grand County, State of
Utah and more particularly described as follows:
BEG 99 feet North and 193 feet East of the Northwest
Corner Block 25 MSS, thence North 243 feet; thence East
50 feet; thence South 243 feet; thence West 50 feet to
the place of beginning. Together with all improvements
thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging.
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C.

The Defendant is awarded a property settlement

in the total sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
DOLLARS, bearing interest at the rate of seven
annum

from

January

1,

1995

until

fully

($18,500.00)

(7%) percent per

paid.

Said

property

settlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the
rate of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($252.23)
per month commencing February 1, 1995 and continuing each and every
month thereafter for a period of eight

(8) years or until said

property settlement together with accumulated interest thereon has
been fully paid. Said property settlement shall be a lien on the
real

property

located

under

the

Outlaw

Saloon

bar

until

the

property award has been fully paid. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay
said property settlement to the Defendant under the terms and
conditions outlined herein. As long as said payments are current,
no

execution

on

the property

settlement

shall

issue

but

the

Defendant shall receive a lien on said real property as provided
for herein.
D.

The Plaintiff is awarded all of her IRA account

free and clear of all claims of the Defendant.
E.

Each party is awarded his or her pre-marital

property free and clear of all claims of the other.
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p^

Each party is awarded those items of marital

personal property i n his or her possession as of the date of trial
on January 3, 1995•
3.

Neither party is awarded any alimony.

4.

EacJ1 party is ordered to pay his or her own Court

costs and attorney's fees in this matter.

LYLE^R. ANDERSON
District Court Judge
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DECREE OF DIVORCE

UKIbllMAL
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney Defendant
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 E a s t Main S t r e e t
P r i c e , Utah 84501
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 6 3 7 - 0 1 7 7

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County

FILED

Frq i 7

tuyj

CLdrtK OF T n c OUURT

f*

BY.

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHERYL MONDERS,

1)

DECREE O F DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
Vs.

]

KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,

>

Civil N o .

9447-8

Defendant.
The above-en titled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Court on the 3rd day of January, 1995, the Honorable
LYLE R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was
personally present and accompanied by her attorney JOANE
WHITE.

Defendant

was personally present

PAPPAS

and accompanied by his

attorney JAMES C. LEWIS. The Court received sworn testimony and
exhibits and took the matter under advisement. Having been fully
advised in the premises, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and
having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.
Defendant.

The

Plaintiff

is

granted

a

divorce

from

the

2.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and

personal property during this marriage and said property is awarded
as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is awarded the Outlaw Saloon bar

together with all of its assets, and the building and property
where

same

is

located,

free

and

clear of all

claims

of

the

Defendant with the exception that the Defendant shall be entitled
to a lien against the real property until the property settlement
awarded to the Defendant has been fully paid. Said property is
located

in

Moab,

Grand

County,

State

of

Utah

and

is

more

particularly described as follows:
BEG 6 RD N & 150 FT W OF NE CORNER BLK 25 MSS, W 67.5 FT,
N 243 FT, E 67 h FT, S 243 FT TO BEG. ALT # 26-21-1-93.
ACRES; 0.38
Together with all improvements thereon and appurtenances
thereunto belonging.

The

Plaintiff

is

ordered

to

assume

and

pay

the

outstanding indebtedness to her uncle, Clair Tangren, for the
underlying obligation on said property and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded any claim or chose-in-

action which the parties may have, free and clear of all claims of
the Defendant, against the Plaintiff's uncle Clair Tangren with
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respect to the adjacent lot located in Moab, Grand County, State of
Utah and more particularly described as follows:
BEG 99 feet North and 193 feet East of the Northwest
Corner Block 25 MSS, thence North 243 feet; thence East
50 feet; thence South 243 feet; thence West 50 feet to
the place of beginning. Together with all improvements
thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging.
C.

The Defendant is awarded a property settlement

in the total sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
DOLLARS, bearing interest at the rate of seven
annum

from

January

1,

1995

until

fully

($18,500.00)

(7%) percent per

paid.

Said

property

settlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the
rate of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($252.23)
per month commencing February 1, 1995 and continuing each and every
month thereafter for a period of eight (8) years or until said
property settlement together with accumulated interest thereon has
been fully paid. Said property settlement shall be a lien on the
real

property

located

under

the Outlaw

Saloon

bar

until

the

property award has been fully paid. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay
said property settlement to the Defendant under the terms and
conditions outlined herein. As long as said payments are current,
no

execution

on

the

property

settlement

shall

issue

but

the

Defendant shall receive a lien on said real property as provided
for herein.
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D.

The Plaintiff is awarded all of her IRA account

free and clear of all claims of the Defendant.
E.

Each party is awarded his or her pre-marital

property free and clear of all claims of the other.
F.

Each party is awarded those items of marital

personal property in his or her possession as of the date of trial
on January 3, 1995.
3.

Neither party is awarded any alimony.

4.

Each party is ordered to pay his or her own Court

costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
DATED this W*

day of

WAPi'^u

^L

LYtE^R. ANDERSON
District Court Judge
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OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT
& CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

James C. Lewis #1943
DIUMENTI & LEWIS
Attorney for Defendant
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292-0447

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHERYL ANN MONDERS,

:
:

OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,

:

Civil No. 9447-8
Judge Anderson

Defendant.

Comes now defendant, Kenneth Monders, by and through counsel of record, James C.
Lewis, and hereby submits his objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
submitted by plaintiff, Cheryl Monders.
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT - OBJECTIONS
1.

In paragraph 6 of plaintiffs proposed findings of fact, and in the Court's

Memorandum Decision dated January 5, 1995, it is stated that plaintiff "owned and operated a
bar in Moab known as the Outlaw Saloon", and that "she [plaintiff] operated the bar in a rented
building". Defendant objects to these statements of fact on the grounds that the evidence at trial

was sufficient to establish that the Outlaw Saloon was owned and operated by both parties, and
that defendant was the principal party involved in the on-site operation of the bar. (See court
record). Further, although it is not disputed that the assets of the initial bar "were purchased with
Cheryl's money", the findings make no mention of the contribution of time and effort by
defendant, in ^establishing and operating the bar, which is supported by the record.

This

paragraph should be revised to include a statement that "Defendant contributed his time and
efforts in establishing and operating this bar, with no pay until 1989.
2.

Defendant objects to paragraph 10 of plaintiffs proposed findings of fact, on the

basis that the record does not support the statement that "Cheryl managed and also worked in the
bar during the same period of time" as defendant. In fact, defendant submits that the record will
show that plaintiff did not work in the bar until the establishment of the second bar at a different
location. (See court record.)
3.

Defendant objects to paragraphs 12 and 13 of plaintiffs proposed findings, on the

following grounds:
(a) It is clear from the record that both parties contracted to purchase the lot from
plaintiffs uncle.
(b) Although the record reflects, as indicated by plaintiff, that defendant did not
contribute any of the down payment on the property, it is equally clear that defendant made a
substantial contribution in his time, at little or no pay, in establishing and operating the new bar.
This paragraph should be expanded to indicate these contributions by defendant.
(c) Paragraph 13 of plaintiffs proposed findings, is clearly inconsistent with the
record, in that both parties "began to remodel and improve the existing building to create a place"
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to operate the bar. Further, the bar was to be owned jointly, consistent with the method in which
title to the property was to be held.
4.

Defendant objects to paragraph 14 of plaintiffs proposed findings of fact. The

record reflects that defendant was an officer and director of the Outlaw Saloon at the time of its
incorporation, uand participated in its formation.

The record also reflects that following its

creation, plaintiff excluded defendant from participation in the corporation, and failed to observe
required corporate formalities, by conducting all of the corporate business herself as the "sole
shareholder". Plaintiffs intentional actions designed to exclude defendant from what otherwise
would be a marital asset, does not support a finding that she was the only shareholder of the
corporation.
5.

Defendant objects to paragraph 19 of plaintiffs proposed findings of fact. The

record reflects that plaintiff was ready, willing and able to exercise the option agreement, and,
based on a letter from her counsel, intended to pursue an action to enforce the terms of the option
agreement. Further, the record reflects that neither plaintiff nor defendant were in default under
this agreement. Moreover, the record reflects that plaintiff was aware that the Outlaw Saloon
building encroached on the adjacent lot, at the time of the purchase of the property. Finally, the
record reflects that plaintiff testified she no longer intends to pursue legal action to purchase the
adjacent property.
6.

Defendant objects to the finding in paragraph 22 of plaintiffs proposed findings

of fact, that an equitable division [of the bar] will require that Cheryl receive more than one-half
of this marital asset. While defendant does not dispute that plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement
of pre-marital assets contributed to the business, the record reflects that defendant has also made
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a substantial contribution in time and effort to the business, and the marital property should be
divided equally after such reimbursement to plaintiff.
7.

Defendant strenuously objects to paragraph 23 of plaintiffs proposed findings of

fact, and, similarly, to the Court's ruling with respect to the value of the Outlaw Saloon, at the
bottom of pagb 5 of its Memorandum Decision. Contrary to the assertions in these findings,
there was no evidence presented regarding the value of the Outlaw Saloon as a going concern.
Quite to the contrary, on cross-examination by defendant's counsel, Joe Kingsley, the plaintiffs
real estate expert, made it clear that his opinions were limited to the value of the real property,
of $155,000, and that he had no opinions regarding the value of the business. No other evidence
was offered regarding the value of the business.
Defendant offered no evidence regarding the value of the business for one simple reason plaintiff consistently represented up until the day of trial, that she intended to sell the business.
It was only when cross-examined at trial that she, for the first time, contradicted representations
previously made, and indicated that she did not intend to offer the business for sale. For
example, in response to Interrogatory No. 23 of Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories,
defendant asks whether plaintiff is willing to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon and
the real property on which it is located, and asks plaintiff to indicate the price at which she
would be willing to sell such assets. In her responses, included as exhibits at trial, plaintiff
responds:
"Yes I am willing to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon Inc., of which I am
100% stockholder and president together with the real property on which it is located of
which I am joint tenant with the Defendant . . . "
Similarly, in response to Interrogatory No. 19 of Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories, in
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which defendant asks plaintiff to describe her efforts to sell the business and real property,
plaintiff states:
"I have told a thousand people that this business will be for sale upon the
completion of this divorce. The names, addresses and telephone numbers is too
lengthy to list at this time. These efforts to sell to these various people are in an
unofficial nature pending the finality of this action. "
Plaintiff has consistently represented since the initiation of this action that it was her
intention to sell the business, which representations were flatly contradicted for the first time at
trial. Clearly, plaintiff was either engaging in a form of deception, by representing one thing in
response to discovery and then contradicting such representations at trial, or intentionally
violating her duty to supplement discovery pursuant to Rule 26(e)(2), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, by failing to amend her prior response regarding her intention to sell the business.
Because plaintiff made it clear in her responses to discovery that she intended to sell the
business, defendant did not find it necessary or prudent to present evidence regarding the value
of the business, as the logical ruling of the court would be to order a sale of the business and to
equitably divide the proceeds therefrom. Defendant was seriously compromised by plaintiffs
contradictory testimony and failure to supplement discovery as required. Further, the record will
reflect that plaintiff failed to present any testimony regarding the value of the business (eg., the
Court will recall that plaintiff was unable to respond to simple questions regarding the financial
statements of the business).
8.

Defendant strenuously objects to paragraph 24 of plaintiffs proposed findings of

fact. Defendant does not believe the record supports a finding that the "prospects of success [on
the adjacent lot] have been dimmed by their failure to pursue their claim. Defendant further
submits that the record supports a finding that (a) this lot has a value substantially in excess of
5

the option price, particularly if it is used in conjunction with the existing Outlaw Saloon business
and property (as testified to by Joe Kingsley); and (b) that there is a probability of prevailing in
an action against plaintiffs uncle. Further, defendant submits that it is inequitable to award this
valuable claim to plaintiff without some award to defendant, particularly in view of plaintiffs
testimony thafshe does not intend to pursue such claim against her uncle.
9.

Defendant objects to paragraph 25 of plaintiffs proposed findings, for the reasons

enumerated above.
10.

Defendant objects to paragraph 26 of plaintiffs proposed findings, on the grounds

that: (a) the record reflects that defendant made a substantial contribution to the pre-marital
property; (b) the record reflects that plaintiff, unlike defendant, has other substantial assets,
including pre-marital contributions to be returned to her; and (c) contrary to the proposed
finding, there was no evidence adduced at trial regarding the value of the business, and its
appreciation.
11.

Defendant objects to the division of equity set forth in paragraph 27 of the

proposed findings, for the reasons enumerated above.
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - OBJECTIONS
12.

Defendant objects to plaintiffs proposed conclusion of law number 2A, on the

grounds that it is inequitable to award the real property and assets to plaintiff. The just and
equitable result would be an order requiring the parties to put the business and real estate up for
sale, and dividing the proceeds from sale equally, after reimbursement of pre-marital assets to
plaintiff. Alternatively, a new trial or hearing should be held to determine the value of the
business - an issue on which evidence was not presented at trial due to plaintiffs representations
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up until the day of trial that she intended to sell the business.
13.

Defendant objects to plaintiffs proposed conclusion number 2B.

The record

reflects that the rights to the lot owned by plaintiffs uncle has substantially greater value than
the option price.

Defendant should be awarded the sole rights to the adjacent lot, due to

plaintiffs testimony that she does not intend to pursue this claim. Alternatively, the value of this
claim should be taken into account in dividing the marital assets.
14.

Defendant objects to proposed conclusion number 2C for the reasons enumerated

above.
DATED this7_t>_ day of February, 1995.
1 & LEWIS

lames C. Lejvfs
Attoniey-^or Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this
to: Joane Pappas White, 475 East Main, #1, Price, Utah 84501.
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M^day of February, 1995,

PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS
TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT
REQUESTS TO PLAINTIFF

NOV-30-94

15.02 FROM: JOANE P A P P A S W H I T E

ESQ.

ID«

O01G3701B3

RAGE

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL HONDERS,
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS
TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT
REQUESTS TO PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,
Vs.
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon
oath, and hereby responds to Defendant's Interrogatories and
Request for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rules 33 and 34
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 27.

For each of the

Requests for Admission set forth in this set of discovery which you
deny, set forth in detail the factual basis for such denial, and
identify and documents or witnesses who provide support for such
denial.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27,

The

Plaintiff

used the following facts as basis for denial of the original
Requests for Admission:
1.

Admission No. 1.

Plaintiff denied Admission No. 1

because the construction of the Outlaw Saloon was started in June

jil

„„
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15=02 FROM

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ.

ID: 801G3701B3
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1987 and the business opened under the direction and control of the
Plaintiff on November 8, 1986• During the construction and opening
of the Outlaw Saloon, the Defendant was merely one (1) of a number
of boyfriends of which the Plaintiff had and had no business
interest whatsoever.

The Parties subsequently go married in 1987

and, after numerous attempts to get the Defendant to participate
in the business in some meaningful way, including the entry of an
agreement in which the Defendant agreed to pay one-half (h)

of

Plaintiff's original investment, which he never did, the plaintiff
gave up trying to include the Defendant in the business. The beer
license was issued in the sole name of Cheryl Monders on August 22,
1986; Cheryl Monders is the sole owner of all stock of the
corporation which owns and operates the outlaw Saloon and provided
all funds for the original acquisition of the property prior to the
date of the marriage.

Additionally, she has provided substantial

amounts -of premarital money into the operation of the Saloon
following

the date of marriage but did so with the express

understanding that she was the sole owner of the business and the
sole owner of the corporation which was expressly set up by her
then legal counsel to assure sole ownership of her investment2.
because

Admission No. 2*

the parties never

Plaintiff denied Admission No. 2

entered

into

a

contract

for the

establishment of the business. The parties entered into a contract
in 1992, some six (6) years after the establishment of the Outlaw
Saloon

wherein

Mr,

Monders

agreed

to

pay

THIRTY

THOUSAND

($30,000.00) DOLLARS plus interest to the Plaintiff in order to
acquire a partial interest in the Outlaw Saloon.

The Defendant

2

NOV-r3

„„

,q.02

FROM:

JOANE

PAPPAS

^
WHITE

«r»
ESQ.

ID.-

801B370183
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refused, failed and neglected to ever perform the terms of said
contract.
3.

Admission No. 3.

Cheryl Monders has previously

admitted that she had an oral agreement with Marvin c. Tangren for
the purchase of real property adjoining the Outlaw Saloon and that
he refused to honor said commitment. She further admitted that she
had one legal opinion which was rendered approximately three and
one-half to four (3 h to 4) years ago wherein the legal opinion
indicated that it was more likely than not that the contract might
be enforceable but the expenses associated with the lawsuit would
run between TEN and FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($10,000 and $15,000) DOLLARSSince the expenses of such suit exceeded the value which the
Plaintiff had agreed to pay for the property, the Plaintiff took
no further efforts.
Statute

of

As a result, Plaintiff now believes that a

Limitations

may

have

run

with

respect

to

the

enforceability of any alleged oral agreement.
4.

Admission No. 4,

Plaintiff denied Admission No. 4

because she has no intention of pursuing legal action to enable her
to exercise the option agreement.
5.

Admission No. 5.

Plaintiff denied Admission No. 5

because it contains several inaccuracies.

Although Plaintiff was

a party to an Option Agreement (which has been stolen along with
the corporate and personal papers and, therefore is not available
for Plaintiff's reinspection)*

Said Option Agreement expired and

no longer exists and, therefore the Plaintiff is not a party to the
agreement. To the best of Plaintiff's information and belief, the
Option Agreement was entered in October of 1990,
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15:03 FROM:

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE

6.

ESQ.

Admission No. 7.

Plaintiff denied Admission No. 7

for the express reasons outlined

in her original Answers to

Admission No. 7.
1.

Admission No. 8.

Plaintiff denied Admission No. 8

for the express reasons outlined

in her original Answers to

Admission No. 88.

Admission No. 9.

Plaintiff denied Admission No. 9

for the express reasons outlined in her original Answers to
Admission No. 9,
REQUEST NO. 8. Please provide copies of
any exhibits you anticipate introducing at trial.
ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 8, We

intend

to

utilize

potentially any documents that have been produced during discovery,
any corporate records, any of the documents which evidence the
original

loan

agreements

between

Cheryl

Monders

and

the

corporation, the original agreement by the Defendant to purchase
an interest in the Saloon, a Financial Statement showing the
Plaintiff's current income and expenses which is in conformity with
the

income

and

expense

materials

contained

the

Answers

to

Interrogatories and an outline of her proposed distribution which
is nothing more than a summary of the testimony she will provide
from the witness stand with respect to her desires for allocation
of assets.
merely

(The final document has not yet been prepared but is

illustrative

of

her

testimony

and

does

not

contain

independent information and is primarily lawyer work product to
assist in the presentation of the testimony).
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3 445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL MONDERS,
;i CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
]

Plaintiff,
Vs.
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,

1 Civil No. 9447-8

Defendant.
)

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of Plaintiff's supplemental Response to Defendant's Second Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, postage
prepaid, posted at Price, Utah on the <5lL_day of November, 1994,
to the following:
James C. Lewis
Attorney at Law
505 South Main
Bountiful, Utah

84010

=4day of November, 1994.

DATED this L^t—

for Plaintiff
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PAGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing Certificate of Service,
postage prepaid, this >\tih day of November, 1994 to the
following:
James C, Lewis
Attorney at Law
505 South Main
Bountiful, Utah

84 010
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL MONDERS,
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST
FOR ADMISSIONS

Plaintiff,
Vs.
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 9447-8

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon
oath, and hereby responds to Defendant's Requests for Admissions
as follows:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
ADMISSION NO. 1 Admit that you are unwilling
to sell the business known as "The Outlaw Saloon", including all
of the personal property used in said business, together with the
real estate on which the business is located, and your rights to
the option agreement, for the total sum of $150,000, payable in
cash within sixty (60) days of signing an earnest money agreement.
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 1

Denies Admission

No. 1.

The Plaintiff would be willing to sell the business known as the
Outlaw Saloon for the sum of ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND
($150,000) DOLLARS in cash payable within sixty (60) days of the

ID«
NO

v _ 3 0 _ 3 4

IB.04 F R O M :

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE

8016370183

P A G E

ESQ.

signing of the earnest money agreement provided that the person
purchasing the property is willing to assume all title defects
associated

with the property

and

further

assuming

that the

Plaintiff will not be required to pay any real estate commissions
costs of sale beyond title insurance and recording fees and will
have to pay no costs for purposes of clearing title to any portion
of this sale property*
ADMISSION NO, 2

Admit that you are unwilling

to sell the property described in the preceding paragraph, for the
total sum of $175,000, on the same terms as described in Request
No. 1, above•
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 2

Plaintiff denies Admission

No. 2 and alleges that Plaintiff is willing to sell the property
for the sum of ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND

($175,000)

DOLLARS in cash providing that costs of clearing title on the
existing^ property does not exceed FIFTEEN THOUSAND

($15f000)

DOLLARS and further providing that costs and terms of sale are as
outlined above,
ADMISSION NO. 3

Admit that you are unwilling

to sell the property described in the preceding paragraph, for the
total sum of $200,000, on the same terms as described in Request
No. 1, above•
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 3

Denies Admission No. 3.

Plaintiff would be willing to sell the property, assume all costs
associated with clearing title, assume all costs of sale and even

2

9
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15:05 FROM:

„~r~ n u T T r p e n
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ.

ID: 8 0 1 G 3 7 0 1 8 3
lu
o

P A G E •£©

assume a real estate commission in the event she was able to obtain
a cash offer under the terms outlined in Admission No. 3,
ADDENDUM TO ADMISSIONS NQ 1, 2, 3
Plaintiffs statements concerning clearing title do not
include any expenses associated with acquiring the property from
Mr* Tangren but merely involves clearing title as it affects
boundary lines of the existing buildings of the Outlaw Saloon.
DATED this J%9^^av of November, 1994,

jTUrtJjAA
IERYL MONDERS,
CHERYL
MONDERS, P l a i n t i f f
k/C\t.l\lWlS Subscribed and sworn t o before me t h i s //L?EH'l day
nQotobar, 1994.

mi

%LL ^
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i s i d i n g At:
At:
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ommission Expires:

EATED t h i O ^ — -

da

Y o f ^ r t e f a a r ; 1994.
'JAVWHITE^

ey for Plaintiff

of

NOV-30-34

15 0 5 F R O M

JOANE PAPPAB

WHITE

ESQ.

ID

B01B3701B3

PAGE

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL MONDERS,
Plaintiff,

|i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,

Vs.
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,
Defendant.

i Civil No. 9447-8

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Second Request for
Admission, postage prepaid, posted at Price, Utah on the
day of November, 1994, to the following:
James C. Lewis
Attorney at Law
505 south Main
Bountiful, Utah

84 010

A

DATED this^XZ— day of November, 1994.

a,v^ u

JOANE-tfAPPAS WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the above and^ooegoing Certificate of Service,
postage prepaid, this 'Onv\ day of November, 1994 to the
following:
James C. Lewis
Attorney at Law
505 South Main
Bountiful, Utah

84010

i
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PLAINTIFFS ANSWERS TO
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, DOCUMENT REQUESTS

\?
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL MONDERS,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,
Defendant.

)
;)
;)
)
]

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, DOCUMENT
REQUESTS

]

Civil No. 9447-8

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon
oath, and hereby responds to Defendant's Interrogatories and
Request for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rules 3 3 and
34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1

Describe in detail

all compensation you have received from the business known as
The Outlaw

Saloon during

the calendar

year

1994.

(In

responding to this interrogatory, Plaintiff should include all
direct and indirect compensation, including personal payments
made on Plaintiff's behalf by the business).
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

With the exception

of February 1994, I was injured and not able to be here.
Housing is provided by the Outlaw Saloon Inc., for a night

watchman.

I elected to be here so as to not hire outside

help.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2

Indicate all of the

periods during the calendar year 1994 during which you were
unable to work due to the injury to your knee cap.

Also

indicate all of the periods in 1994 during which you have
worked as a manager or a bartender of the Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: I was and still am
the owner and manager of the Outlaw Saloon Inc., since its
inception in 1986 to date.

I was off work and still am as a

bartender from January 12, 1994 and to date have not been
released.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3

Please

indicate

whether or not your doctors have released you to work, and,
if so, indicate the date of such release, and whether you are
willing to produce a copy of said release.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
released back to work.
closed by Dr. Patterson.

I have not been

As of October 4, 1994 my case was
I am not signing any release until

I try bartending which will be the end of November 1994.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4

Describe all workers

compensation benefits you have received as a result of your
injury during the 1994 calendar year, and, in that regard,
indicate the following:

2

(a)
such

the monthly payments received by you; the date

payments

commenced;

and

the

date

such

payments

terminated, if applicable;
(b)

the name of the workers

compensation

fund

paying such benefits.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
(a)

$167.00 per week; January

March 24, 1994.
(b)

13, 1994 through

See attached Compensation Agreement.

Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5

Indicate whether or

not any of the assets contained in your safety deposit box at
First Security

Bank of Utah, Moab, Utah, 84532,

#470, as

identified in Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory Number 14
of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, were acquired
during the course of the marriage.

If so, identify what

assets were acquired during the marriage.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

A title to the

Outlaw Saloon Inc., Ford 1984 Ford Escort, bought with a part
of my inheritance money 1988, two (2) birth certificates for
my children (acquired by a former marriage), one (1) Kougann,
acquired in 1982 and miscellaneous photos.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6
specificity

the

"miscellaneous

Identify

items11

identified

with
in

subparagraph (a) in Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory Number
14 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories.

3

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

A title to the

Outlaw Saloon Inc., Ford 1984 Ford Escort, bought with a part
of my inheritance money 1988, two (2) birth certificates for
my children (acquired by a former marriage), one (1) Kougann,
acquired in 1982 and miscellaneous photos.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7

Indicate all of the

dates you have lived in the apartment unit located on the real
property on which the Outlaw Saloon is located, since the
separation of the parties.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

I did live in the

caretakers apartment alone starting November 9, 1993 until
January 14, 1994.

I was then thrown out of my bar and house

on a fraudulent ex-parte order and did not get back into the
apartment until March 15, 1994. I have been there ever since.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8

Indicate whether you

have personally paid for each and every personal expense
identified

in

response

to

Interrogatory

Number

16

of

Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, or whether some or
any of those expenses have been paid by the Outlaw Saloon.
If the Outlaw Saloon has paid some of such expenses, please
identify which expenses it has paid.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Rent

was

furnished by the Outlaw Saloon Inc., in the caretaker's
apartment, but if I chose not to stay another party would have
been paid.

Lights, water and laundry facilities are included

in the apartment for the service of caretaking.
4

All other

expenses are paid for personally.

The Plaintiff is still

paying for the Defendant's medical insurance.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9 Indicate the original
purchase price of the shares of Canyonlands Cafe and Motel
identified by Plaintiff in response to Interrogatory Number
25 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9

In June of 1986,

ten (10) months prior to my marriage, I purchased shares in
the Canyonlands Motel and Cafe Inc.

This stock was owned by

me prior to my marriage and was sold for FIFTEEN THOUSAND
($15,000.00) DOLLARS and was deposited into the Outlaw Saloon
Inc. , checking account for the purpose of building the present
Outlaw Saloon Inc., #2. The original purchase price was TEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE ($10,545.00) DOLLARS which
has already been answered in the first set of Interrogatories.
INTERROGATORY NO, 10 Indicate the source
of funds for the purchase of the shares of Canyonlands Cafe
and Motel.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10
purchased

prior

to

my

marriage.

The

Plaintiff

stock

was

objects to

providing information on the source of the funds as the shares
were premarital.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11 Please describe what
you mean by your response of "recalled

1988-approx." in

response to Interrogatory Number 25 of Defendants's First Set
of Interrogatories.
5

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11

This was a tax

free Missouri Authority Bond bought in 1982.
prior to my marriage.
THOUSAND

Five (5) years

It was recalled in 1988 and the TEN

($10,000) DOLLARS received was then placed

in my

checking account.
INTERROGATORY

NO.

12

Please

indicate

whether you are willing to provide a copy of the financial
statement

or

Interrogatory

statements
Number

28

referred
of

to

in

Defendant's

response
First

to

Set

of

Interrogatories, located at Nate Knight Accounting, or whether
Defendant will be required to incur the cost and inconvenience
of subpoenaing such records.

Please indicate the same with

respect to the financial statement or statements located at
the office of Clara Wilburg.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12

Y e s ,

see

attached.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13

Please describe in

detail the "many heirlooms11 you claim Defendant possesses in
response to Interrogatory Number 3 0 of Defendant's Fires Set
of Interrogatories
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13
from

my

mother

around

19 62.

grandmother helped make it.

It

was

A patchwork quilt
hand

made

Both are now deceased.

and

my

Value

priceless, ($10,000.00); Rocker high back spindle (era 1898)
irreplaceable,

value unknown priceless. ($700.00) given to

me by my mother twenty

(26) years ago in 1967; High back
6

straight chair, value unknown ($500.00), acquired in 1980 gift
from my mother; and one (1) pair of diamond earrings, a
birthday gift to me from my mother in 1985, small gold rose
bud with a diamond center, valued at ($550.00).
INTERROGATORY NO, 14
specific

information

Interrogatory

Number

requested
36

of

Please provide the

in subparagraphs
Defendant's

First

(a-e) to
Set

of

Interrogatories, which information was omitted in Plaintiff's
first response to said Interrogatory.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14 Please see Financial
Summary attached hereto.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15

Please indicate to

whom you reported that assets were stolen, as indicated in
subparagraph 12 of plaintiff's response to Interrogatories
Numbers 36 and 37 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15

Moab City Police

Department, Steve Ross, February 26, 1994.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16 Indicate whether or
not there were any other individuals, in addition to the
individuals identified in plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory
Number 3 8 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, who may
testify at the trial of this action, and indicate the matters
upon which it is anticipated such individual(s) may testify.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16

Plaintiff Cheryl

Monders will testify on all issues raised by her Complaint;
Sharon Sellers, employee of the Outlaw Saloon, Inc., who will
7

testify

concerning

the

operation

of

the

Saloon

and

J.W.

violence towards Cheryl; Debra Edwards, employee of the Outlaw
Saloon, Inc., who will testify concerning the operation of the
Saloon and J.W. violence towards Cheryl; Joe Kingsley who will
testify with respect to the market value of the Outlaw Saloon;
Mary Lou Shupe, Abuse; Dennis Nielson, abuse; Dennis Wilberg,
Abuse; Mike Gillispie, abuse; Dan Black, Outlaw Saloon Inc,
#1 and #2; Don Covey, Canyonlands Motel and Outlaw Saloon;
Jeane Couchman, Canyonlands Motel and Outlaw Saloon; Maria
Fergurson, Outlaw Saloon, Inc. #1 and

#2; Willie Tucker,

Canyonlands Motel, Outlaw Saloon #1 and abuse.
JOANE REVIEW
INTERROGATORY NO. 17 Indicate whether you
are willing to obtain a copy of your payroll records which
show your earnings from January 1, 1994 to the present from
Smuin,

Rich

and

Marsing,

as

identified

in

answer

to

Defendant's request number 1 of Defendant's First Request for
Production of Documents.

Alternatively, indicate whether you

are willing to sign a release or consent, authorizing the
release of such records to Defendant.
ANSWER

TO

INTERROGATORY

Employer's Quarterly Wage List.

NO.

17

See

attached

Yes, I am willing to sign a

consent to release such records.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18

Indicate whether

your personal tax returns and tax returns for the business for
the Outlaw Saloon, for the calendar year 1993, have been
8

completed.

If so, indicate whether you will provide a copy

of said tax returns.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO, 18
completed and sent in.

Yes, they were

Yes I will provide a copy.

INTERROGATORY NO, 19

Describe in detail

all efforts undertaken by you, or anyone on your behalf, to
sell, or offer for sale, the business known as the Outlaw
Saloon, and the real property on which the Outlaw Saloon is
located.

In responding to this Interrogatory, please identify

all individuals with whom contact has been made regarding a
prospective sale to the business, including the names and
addresses of prospective buyers, the names and addresses of
real estate brokers or agents involved in such prospective
sale, and any other individuals who may have been involved in
any such prospective transaction.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19

I have

told

a

thousand people that this business will be for sale upon the
completion

of

this

divorce.

The

names,

addresses

and

telephone numbers is too lengthy to list at this time. These
efforts to sell to these various people are in an unofficial
nature pending the finality of this action.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20

Please identify any

appraisals, property evaluations or reevaluations conducted
on the real property and the business known as the Outlaw
Saloon.

In responding to such Interrogatory, indicate the

name, address and telephone number of any person or firm who
9

was involved in such appraisal, evaluation or reevaluation,
and indicate what information was provided to any such party
by you or anyone on your behalf to enable such party to
complete their appraisal, evaluation or reevaluation*
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY N O - 2 0

Bob

Muir

estimated value based on structure, size, type, age and the
quality

of the construction.

HUNDRED

FIFTY

to

ONE

The value was

HUNDRED

SIXTY

between

THOUSAND

ONE

DOLLARS

($150,000.00 to $160,000.00) - Closed door business.

The

business was worth six (6%) percent of one (1) years profit.
He is now deceased.

Grand County Assessors Office.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21

Indicate the source

of the deposit of $37,912.35 into your Golden Passbook Savings
Account, #18378423, on September 19, 1990.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21

See

Financial

Summary attached hereto.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22

Indicate where the

funds from the withdrawal on October 2, 1990 in the amount of
$2 3,000.00',

from

the

account

referred

to

in

the

above

paragraph, were transferred.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22
transferred
property,

to M.
quonset

C. Tangren
hut,

for

building

a down
and

lot.

They
payment
See

were
on

the

attached

document for production #9.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23 Indicate whether you
are willing to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon,
10

together with the real property on which it is located, and
all of your rights to purchase the adjacent lot #95, pursuant
to an option agreement with your uncle.

If the answer to this

Interrogatory is "yes," indicate the price at which you would
be willing to sell these properties and assets.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23

Yes, I am willing

to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon Inc., of which
I am 100% stockholder and president together with the real
property on which it is located of which I am a joint tenant
with the Defendant whom has not contributed any monies for the
purpose of said lot. No I cannot sell something I do not have
on the adjacent lot #95.

I do not have an option.

INTERROGATORY NO. 24 Indicate whether you
would

be willing to split with

appraisal tot

defendant the cost of an

the business and real property on which the

Outlaw Saloon is located, if such appraisal can be completed
prior to the trial date.

In responding to this Interrogatory,

indicate all conditions you and your counsel would require to
such an arrangement.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24
INTERROGATORY NO. 25

NO.
Indicate if you are

willing to have a real estate expert engaged by Defendant,
inspect the premises, and receives all of the pertinent books
and records of the Outlaw Saloon.

If so, indicate what, if

any, books and records of the business you are not willing to
allow such person to review.
11

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 6

No.
Please describe in

detail all monies you claim are owed to you by the Outlaw
Saloon, or Defendant.

In responding to such Interrogatory,

describe the date(s) such monies were advanced by you to the
Outlaw Saloon or Defendant, the source of such monies, and any
documentation,

instruments,

or

papers

evidencing

such

obligation or transfer of monies.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 26
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE
interest.

($89,193.00) DOLLARS plus

Amount of money documented.

money has been made.

EIGHTY-NINE

No return on this

This money was put up by the Plaintiff

as the financier of the Outlaw Saloon #1 and #2. These monies
would

have

earned

the

Plaintiff

THIRTY-FIVE

THOUSAND

($35,000.00) DOLLARS in the period of time had this money been
placed in other endeavors.

See financial Summary attached

hereto.
INTERROGATORY NO. 27

For each of the

Requests for Admission set forth in this set of discovery
which you deny, set forth in detail the factual basis for such
denial, and identify any documents or witnesses who provide
support for such denial.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27

These

will

be

supplemented.
INTERROGATORY NO. 28
all outstanding

Describe in detail

indebtedness or obligations of the Outlaw
12

Saloon, including date the indebtedness or obligation was
incurred,

name

and

address

of

the

creditor,

amount

of

indebtedness outstanding, and payment terms.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 28

Cheryl Monders,

indebtedness, ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
NINETY-THREE
THOUSAND

($124,193.00)

DOLLARS.

FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE

M.C.

Tangren,

DOLLARS AND

FORTY

SIXTY-NINE

($40,483.69) CENTS, monthly payment SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX
DOLLARS AND TWENTY-SIX ($456.26) CENTS, payment on terms on
Cheryl ten (10%) percent interest increasing compounded.
INTERROGATORY
individual

or

firm which

NO.

you have

29

Identify

any

engaged,

or which

you

anticipate engaging, to testify at trial regarding the value
of the business known as the Outlaw Saloon, the real property
on which it is located, and/or lot 95.

In responding to this

Interrogatory, describe in detail the matters on which it is
anticipated such individual(s) or firm(s) will testify, and
describe in detail all documents, papers, materials, and other
information that has been provided or which it is anticipated
will be provided, to such individual(s) or firm(s), to enable
such party or parties to perform such work.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 29

Joe Kingsley

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1

Please provide

copies of the bank statements for the Outlaw Saloon, covering
the

period

beginning

from

the
13

date

of

inception

of

the

business through September 30, 1994.

(These documents were

previously requested in Defendant's First Set of Discovery,
but

bank

statements

covering

only

Plaintiff's

personal

accounts were produced in response to this request.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1
statements

from

1986, 1988 - 1989

present are sketchy.

B

are missing.

a

n

k

1991 to

See attached.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2

Please provide

a copy of the cash register receipts from the Outlaw Saloon,
for each day

from January

1, through September

30, 1994.

Alternatively, Plaintiff can make these receipts available for
inspection at a mutually convenient time, and indicate when
such documents may be available.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2

C

a

S

h

register receipts can be made available to Defendant's counsel
at the Outlaw Saloon.

Please advise which day would

be

convenient through Plaintiff's counsel.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3
a

copy

of

any

contracts,

correspondence

Please provide
or

documents

pertaining to any remodeling, improvements, refurbishing or
other construction performed on the real property and business
known as the Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3

Construction

has not started.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4

Please provide

any documentation, papers and writings which support your
14

claim that you contributed pre-marital monies or assets to the
business known as the Outlaw Saloon and the real property on
which it sits.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4

See attached

Financial Summary.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 5

Please provide

monthly personal bank statements for any and all checking or
other accounts which would show your personal expenditures
during the calendar year 1994.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5

Previously

submitted in First Set of Answers to Interrogatories.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6

Please provide

copies of any contracts, correspondence, and other documents
pertaining to the option agreement with Marvin Tangren, and
the real property owned by Marvin C
to

the

property

on

which

commonly known as Lot 95.

the

Tangren, located adjacent

Outlaw

Saloon

is

located,

Such response should include any

correspondence between your counsel and Mr. Tangren, and from
Mr. Tangren to you or your counsel.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6
were stolen.
26, 1994.

These items

I reported them to Moab City Police on February

See police report on production no. 12.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7

Please provide

copies of all corporate documents of the Outlaw Saloon, Inc.,
including articles of incorporation and bylaws, as amended;
minutes of meetings of, or action taken by, the board of
15

directors, officers, and shareholders, and contracts between
the corporation and any third parties.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7

See attached

hereto.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8

Please provide

copies of any exhibits you anticipate introducing at trial.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8

I

will

supplement.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9
copies

of

any

documents

or

writings

Please provide

which

reflect

any

outstanding indebtedness or obligation of The Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9

See attached

hereto.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10

Please provide

copies of all paystubs or other documentation which evidences
any compensation, direct or indirect, received by you from The
Outlaw Saloon during 1994.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10 A t t a c h e d
hereto.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11
copies

of

all

financial

statements

of

The

Please provide
Outlaw

Saloon

prepared by Nate Knight Accounting, Clara Wilburg, or any
other person or firm on behalf of you or The Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11 See attached
hereto.
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 12
a copy of any reports

Please provide

of stolen assets, as described

in

Interrogatory Number 15.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12

S e e

attached hereto.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13

Please provide

copies of any tax returns, annual or quarterly, for 1993 and
1994, filed for either you personally or The Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13

See

attached hereto.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14

Please provide

a copy of any appraisal, evaluation or assessment of the
business of The Outlaw Saloon, and/or the real property on
which it is located, and Lot 95.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14
appraisal from Bob Muir was asked

for.

T h e

Sizes, facts and

business figures were brought up but it was never completed.
He passed away.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15

Please provide

a copy of any other documents identified in response to the
Interrogatories set forth.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15 A t t a c h e d
hereto.
DATED this •%H\*y

of November, 1994.

'~~JOMJE PAPPAS WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Carbon

)
:
)

ss.

CHERYL MONDERS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
states that she is the Defendant in the above-entitled action;
that she has read the above and foregoing and knows the
contents thereof, and that the same is true and correct to the
best of her knowledge, except as to those matters therein
stated upon information and belief, and as to such matters
believes the same to be true.

"fttSrtU ^
ERYL MONDE:
CHERYL
MONDERS
Subscribed and sworn to before me this'" J__J__' day of
November, 1994.
P
r
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diction when defendant conveyed during pendency of action; Subdivision (c) continues litigation with same litigants to determinative
conclusion, to avoid stalemate by conveyance

pendente lite, resulting in series of endless
suits. Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d
538 (1953).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
$S 225 et seq., 231 to 233.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties § 58 et seq.
A.L.R. — Enforceability of warrant of attorney to confess judgment against assignee,
guarantor, or other party obligating himself
for performance of primary contract, 5
A.L.R.3d 426.
Divorce or annulment of marriage, power of
incompetent spouse's guardian, committee, or
next friend to sue for granting or vacation of,
,
•
1*1
*•
u
or to make a compromise or settlement in such
„ •* a A T r> OJ £oi
suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681.
Bank's right to apply or set off deposit
against debt of depositor not due at time of his
death 7 A L R 3d 908
Validity and effect of agreement that debt or
legal obligation contemporaneously or subsequently incurred shall be canceled by death of
creditor or obligee, 11 A.L.R.3d 1427.
Applicability, as affected by change in parties, of statute permitting commencement of

new action within specified time after failure
of prior action not on merits, 13 A.L.R.3d 848.
Cause of death, official death certificate as
evidence of in civil or criminal action, 21
A.L.R.3d 418.
Attorney's death prior to final adjudication
0 r settlement of case as affecting compensation
contingent fee contract, 33 A.L.R.3d
under
1375
Validit
i n c o n t r a c t for i n s t a l l m e n t s a i e 0 f
,
. .
consumer bgoods, or commercial paper
given in
. .
.,
_
. / r
°.
connection therewith, of provision waiving, as
.
,
„
x
c
against assignee defenses good against seller,
39 A.L.R.3d 0I8.
Conservator or guardian for an incompetent.
priority and preference in appointment of, 65
A.L.R.3d 991.
Defamation action as surviving plaintifTs
death, under statute not specifically covering
action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272.
Key Numbers. — Parties e= 59.

PART V.
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY.
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes;
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
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able from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive, (n) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought, or
(in) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation The court may act upon its own initiative aftei reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c)
(2) I n s u r a n c e a g r e e m e n t s . A partv mav obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment Information concerning
the insurance agreement is not bv reason of disclosure admissible in
evidence at trial For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insurance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement
(3) Trial p r e p a r a t i o n : M a t e r i a l s . Subject to the piovisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party ma\ obtain discovery of documents and
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter prev lously made by that party Upon
request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by
that person If the request is refused, the person may move for a court
order The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion For purposes of this paragraph, a
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded
(4) Trial preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows*
(A) (I) A party may through interrogatories require any other
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to
call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion
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(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b)
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) t h a t the discovery not be had;
(2) t h a t the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) t h a t certain matters not be inquired into, or t h a t the scope of the
discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) t h a t discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the
court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) t h a t the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) S e q u e n c e and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
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otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact t h a t
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not
operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response t h a t was complete when made is under no
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired,
except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows t h a t the response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing
concealment.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new
requests for supplementation of prior responses.
(f) Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action,
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by
the attorney for any party if the motion includes:
( D a statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after
service of the mo( ; on.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary
for the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered
or amended whenever justice so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre81
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sented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state
his address The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is (1)
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation If a request, response, or objection
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to
it until it is signed
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, oi
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount
of the reasonable expenses m c u n e d because of the violation, including a leasonable attorney fee
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an
action or pioceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person
within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and
limitations as if such action or proceeding weie pending in this state, provided
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided furthei
t h a t all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the
lules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court
in the county where the deposition is being taken
(Amended effective J a n 1, 1987 )
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes —Thi& lule corresponds
to Rule 26 F R C P
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s — Admis<;ibilitv ofevi
dence, ^ 78 21 3 Rule 43(a)
Continuance
to permit idisco\er\ Rule o6if)
n
4.
n T
Depositions upon oral examination Rule
30(c)
Depositions use in court proceedings Rule
32
Depositions when taken Rule 30(a)
Discover proceduies Rule 4 502 Rules of
Judicial Administration
Exclusion of deposition from evidence Rule
32(b)

Expert and other opinion testimonv Rules
701 to 706 U R E
Liability insurance, admissibility of Rule
^ R E
411
»*
*
J
J
*
r>
i
Motions
e\idence
on U
by
Rule
J depositions
v
43(b)
Privileges <rt 78-24 8 78-24-9, Rule 501 et
seq
IRE
Summary judgment, discoveiy supporting or
opposing motion for Rule 56(e)
Terminate or limit examination, motion to
Rule 30(d)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

—Trade secrets
—Waiver
Purpose of rule
Scope of discovery
j n general

Applicability of rule
Privilege against self-incrimination
Protective order
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their authenticity, to accept a copy of defendant's written admissions served upon plaintiff
as compliance with the rules; where the trial
court chose the latter option, it was proper to
permit plaintiff to recite defendant's admissions into the record. Triple I Supply, Inc. v.
Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982).
—Failure to respond.
Objectionable matter.
Even if a request for an admission is objectionable, if a party fails to object and fails to
respond to the request, then that party should
be held to have admitted the matter. Jensen v.
Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah
1985).
Prison inmate.
When inmate served requests for admissions
and interrogatories on prison officials in action
for recovery of value of personal property taken
from him, on failure of officials to respond to
the requests, apply for extension of time, or
move to amend or withdraw their admissions
pursuant to Subdivision (b), all the facts were

deemed admitted and the inmate was entitled
to judgment against the officials. Schmitt v.
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
—Motion to dismiss.
Tolling.
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect
of Subdivision (a), which treats requests for admissions which are not answered within 45
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
—Punitive damages.
Where plaintiff requests an admission of punitive damages in an amount unrelated to actual damages, the court, as a matter of equity,
must intervene and examine the admission.
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98
(Utah 1985).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151,
379 P.2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner,
Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734
(Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325.
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110.
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure testimony of absent witness in civil case, admissions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and
rules, to respond to request for admission of

facts not within his personal knowledge, 20
A.L.R.3d 756.
Formal sufficiency of response to request for
admissions under state discovery rules. 8
A.L.R.4th 728.
Permissible scope, respecting nature of inquiry, of demand for admissions under modern
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489.
Key Numbers. — Discovery <£=> 121 to 129.

Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
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with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of e x p e n s e s of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or t h a t other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner,
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a contempt of t h a t court.
(2) Sanctions by court in w h i c h action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order t h a t the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
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(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(c) E x p e n s e s on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at o w n deposition or serve a n s w e r s to
interrogatories or respond to request for i n s p e c t i o n . If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a w r ritten
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§ 78-32-1 et seq.
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